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RECESS APPOINTMENTS AND AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 
William Ty Mayton* 
Presidents Clinton and Bush have revived a quiescent ex-
ecutive power, that of recess appointments to the bench. In the 
last few days of his presidency Mr. Clinton made one such ap-
pointment. Following suit, Mr. Bush has now made two. All 
three appointments were of presidential nominees for whom 
Senate confirmation, either up or down, had been forestalled by 
parliamentary moves. For both Presidents the attractive feature 
of a recess appointment was that it placed their nominees on the 
bench without Senate confirmation. But because of this by-pass 
these appointments have been questioned, on political and con-
stitutional grounds. This article is about the constitutional part of 
the debate. The constitutional issues examined are: first, whether 
present use of the recess appointments clause is so expansive as 
to exceed the power in fact granted by the clause, thereby in-
fringing the senatorial prerogative of "advice and consent," and 
second, whether recess appointments to the bench infringe the 
personal right, as derived from Article III of the Constitution, to 
federal courts presided over by judges "free of political domina-
tion." This second issue, respecting the right to judges free of po-
litical domination, shows that recess appointments to the bench 
are a special case. 
Considering that these issues of power and right interact so 
complexly, an overview seems useful, which view best starts by 
identifying the recess appointments clause and its purpose. The 
clause provides, "The President shall have Power to fill up all 
vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by 
granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their next 
Session. "1 The purpose underlying this power is evident. In 1789 
and for ten sessions thereafter, intersession recesses of Congress 
* Simmons Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I thank Seth 
Cohen, 2L Emory, for his assistance and research. 
I. U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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averaged seven months in length.2 During these several months 
important public offices might go vacant. In anticipation of these 
inopportune vacancies, the framers modified the standard of 
Senate confirmation to allow for temporary presidential ap-
pointments to fill them as needed. Today, however, recesses of 
the Senate are not seven months but four to five weeks. In this 
short time, a new session is just around the corner and in any 
event modern communications and transportation allow for spe-
cial sessions of the Senate wherein crucial offices might be filled. 
Therefore, the urgency toward which the recess clause was di-
rected is not today a factor. This is especially so respecting the 
bench, where other judges-by inter- and intracircuit transfers-
can cover a vacated post. 
In any event, the clause today often serves a purpose quite 
different from that of ensuring that the public service does not 
suffer due to a vacancy in office left unfilled while the Senate is 
dispersed and unavailable during its recess. Presently the clause 
is used to create a place-holder in office who may thereby gain a 
prescriptive advantage respecting that office. This possibility was 
in fact noticed early on, by Senator John Quincy Adams, Jr., as 
he wrote his father of a certain tactical advantage open to the 
President. "Provisional appointments," he wrote, might be made 
during a recess of the Senate, so that "when the Senate meet, the 
candidates proposed to their consideration are already in posses-
sion of the office to which they are to be appointed. "3 In this 
sense, Mr. Clinton may have made a politically astute move (as 
the New York Times put it)4 in his recess appointment of Judge 
Gregory. By it he put in place, ahead of the incoming Bush ad-
ministration, his own candidate. Somewhat similarly, the ap-
pointments by President Bush, of Judges Pickering and Pryor, 
may defuse the filibusters that keep these appointments from be-
ing voted on. These are the political possibilities of the clause. 
Safe to say, though, recess appointments for these reasons are 
not what the clause is about. 
The second part of this overview is about whether the pre-
sent use of the recess appointments clause exceeds the terms of 
the clause. These terms are that the President may fill vacancies 
that "happen during the Recess of the Senate." Vacancies that 
2. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1993-94 Official Directory,103d Cong. 580 (1993). 
3. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 265 (1968). 
4. "White House officials and other democrats said they thought Mr. Clinton's 
action was particularly astute because it could put the Republicans on the defensive .... " 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,2000, at www.nyt.com/12/2000-28/politics. 
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happen not during but before a recess- when the Senate is in 
session and available for confirmation- do not generally create 
the same urgency as vacancies that "happen during the recess of 
the Senate." However, recess appointments as they are made to-
day-as in the case of Clinton and Bush's appointments to the 
bench-are usually for vacancies that did not happen while the 
Senate was in recess. Rather, the vacancy happens at some other 
time and then, usually after the Senate fails to fill the post by not 
acting on the President's nominee, the President places a nomi-
nee on the bench without that appointment and by a recess ap-
pointment. The scope of power issue raised by this practice is, of 
course, that the President has exceeded the power in fact pro-
vided by the text of the clause. However, in United States v. Al-
locco, which case is (improperly) viewed as the single, control-
ling authority here, the Ninth Circuit found that the plain terms 
of the clause had been modified by a certain "gloss of history."5 
While Allocco is itself weak on this point, the possibility remains 
that the terms of Article II have been levered out of their plain 
meaning by a concession on the part of Congress, a 1940 
amendment to the Tenure of Office Act. But along with noting 
this possibility of concession, it is also correct to note that such 
claims of concession are disfavored. As explained by the Su-
preme Court, the appointment provisions of Article II "pre-
serves ... the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing 
the diffusion of the appointment power": 
Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive 
this structural protection. . . . The structural interests 
protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of 
any one branch of Government but of the entire Repub-
lic.6 
This overview's third part is about rights derived from Arti-
cle III of the Constitution. In this respect, assume that the Presi-
dent does indeed have the power to make a recess appointment, 
but consider the possibility of a check to that power by an asser-
tion of right. There are two such rights. One is what case law 
speaks of as a public right, which is our collective interest in "the 
role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional 
5. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir., 1962), discussed in text at infra 
notes 114-119. 
6. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991). In Freytag, the claim was 
that the courts should "defer to the Executive Branch's decision that there has been no 
legislative encroachment on Presidential prerogatives under the Appointments Clause." 
!d. at 878. The Court rejected that claim for the reasons stated above. 
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scheme of tripartite government. "7 The "role" thus protected is 
the better capacity of a politically independent court to sustain 
the checks and balances feature of "tripartite government." I do 
not wish to understate this "public right" nor imply that it is not 
relevant to the case of recess appointments to the bench. After 
all, in reference to the structural guarantee this right embodies, 
the Supreme Court, in Nguyen v. United States,8 recently vacated 
a federal court of appeals decision because the panel that ren-
dered it included a judge who did not have the lifetime tenure 
that Article III requires. Nonetheless, Article III includes a dif-
ferent sort of right that is more pressing. This right is the "per-
sonal right" to "have claims decided before judges who are free 
from potential domination by other branches of government. "9 
This right is in play in each and every case heard by a recess ap-
pointee, and is always highly visible, always so rightly owed, and 
always so clearly breached. 
When a recess appointee hears a case, whether he or she 
gains a permanent appointment to the bench is yet to be deter-
mined; whether the appointee gains tenure is contingent upon 
renomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. 
The recess appointee, then, is not freed from political pressure 
and therefore acts in the face of the personal right- as can be 
claimed by any party whose claim the appointee hears-to be 
heard by a politically independent judge. The startling prospect 
of an assertion of this right is that whether reached singly by a 
district court judge or jointly by an appellate panel, each and 
every judgment that includes a recess appointee stands to be 
overturned. 
In recess appointments, the right to a judge freed of political 
domination first came before the courts in Ex Parte Ward. 10 In 
this 1899 decision the right was asserted but the Supreme Court 
would not hear it owing to now defunct jurisdictional grounds. 
Eighty-five years later in 1984, the right was heard and decided 
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Woodley. 11 In defendant's 
7. Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). The 
courts also refer to this feature of the political autonomy required of judges by Article III 
as the "structural principle." /d. at 850. 
8. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003). 
9. Schor, 478 U.S. at, 848; Northern Pipeline Const. Co, v. Marathon Pipe Line, 
458 u.s. 50,58 (1982). 
10. 173 u.s. 452 (1899). 
11. United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en bane, 
751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). United States v. Allocco, 
305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir., 1962), is often referred to in relation to the right to a judge free of 
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appeal from her conviction in a criminal case, the court on its 
own motion overturned the judgment against her because it had 
been rendered by a recess appointee, holding that because "[h)e 
lacks the essential attributes of an Article III judge, a recess ap-
pointee to the federal bench cannot exercise the judicial power 
of the United States."12 However, on rehearing en bane, the cir-
cuit in a split decision reversed this initial decision and reinstated 
the defendant's conviction. 
In a notable dissent to the en bane opinion, Judge Norris 
would have resolved the conflict between the recess appoint-
ments clause and Article III according to the canon that "[consti-
tutional) principles" must be considered as "of equal dignity, and 
... must [not) be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair 
another."13 Judge Norris explained that no significant impair-
ment of the recess appointment is caused by excluding judges 
from its scope. Among other things, inter- and intracircuit trans-
fers of judges, as provided by Title 28, alleviate immediate and 
acute problems caused by a vacancy on the bench.14 In contrast, 
the independence of the judiciary is substantially impaired 
whenever a judge's work is subject to political review. A recess 
appointee's work is subject to such review and no human being 
can be oblivious of that. In these comparative terms, resolution 
of the conflict between the recess appointments clause and Arti-
cle III was clear and certain: the Article III standard of a politi-
cally independent judiciary clearly prevailed.15 
However, a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges chose a 
method different than the "resolution according to purposes" 
method used by dissent and this different method produced a 
different result. The majority instead looked to history, accord-
ing to Justice Frankfurter's dictum that "a systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Con-
gress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who 
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution ... may be treated as 
a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President."16 Doing so, 
political domination. This case, though, was instead largely concerned with the scope of 
the President's power, with whether the vacancy filled by a recess appointment must 
have been created "during the recess" in which the appointment was made. 
12. 726 F.2d at 1339. 
13. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 353 (1908). As expressed by Judge Norris, 
"the resolution of conflict between two provisions of the Constitution requires an evalua-
tion and balancing of underlying values." 751 F.2d at 1022. 
14. 751 F.2d at 1024. 
15. See id. at 1022-24. 
16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
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the majority found that a long history of recess appointments to 
the bench had established a practice of recess appointees hearing 
cases, which practice amounted to the requisite gloss of history. 
However, the history, historiography really, used by those judges 
was off target, both in content and in technique. I say this know-
ing that in 1795 George Washington made a recess appointment, 
of John Rutledge, to the Supreme Court and that about 160 
years later President Eisenhower placed three Justices-Earl 
Warren, William Brennan, and Potter Stewart-on the Court by 
that same route. 
The problem with the history used in the Woodley case is 
that actually it was not focused on the issue in the case. This is-
sue was not the mere fact of recess appointment but the fact the 
appointee had gone ahead and heard cases prior to Senate con-
firmation and while he was yet in that political limbo. At first 
glance, this distinction between the fact of appointment and the 
appointee in fact hearing cases may seem odd but, then, consider 
this: Of the twelve recess-appointments to the Court prior to the 
Eisenhower appointees, only two had heard cases prior to their 
confirmation. Justice Rutledge did so and then Justice Benjamin 
Curtis in 1851, for a total of four cases between them. Following 
Curtis and for the next one hundred years, no recess appointee 
heard cases prior to his Senate confirmation. 
For instance, John Harlan received a recess appointment to 
the Supreme Court on March 29, 1877. The Senate confirmed 
that appointment on November 29 of that year. Thereafter, he 
took the oath of office on December 10. The U.S. Reports for 
that year contain a "Memorandum" setting forth this informa-
tion and additionally stating that Mr. Harlan "took no part in the 
decision of the cases reported in this volume preceding United 
States v. Fox." 17 That case was both argued and decided after 
Justice Harlan was confirmed by the Senate and then sworn in. 
In at least the century preceding the Eisenhower appointments 
to the Supreme Court, the practice, then, was that Supreme 
Court appointees did not hear cases prior to confirmation and 
the fact that they did not was in succeeding years noted in the 
Senate, there described as a "fine practice" and the better part of 
judicial ethics.18 
J ., concurring). 
17. Preface to 97 U.S. REP. (1877). Some sources list Oct. 15, 1877 as the date of 
Harlan's recess appointment. The October date, though, is when President Hayes nomi-
nated him for a permanent seat on the Court. 
18. 81 CONG. REC. 7993 (1937). See also infra notes 71-72. 
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The unsettling part about the Eisenhower appointees, then, 
was that they decided cases before they, the appointees, were 
sheltered by the political independence that confirmation pro-
vides. For this reason notable scholars such as Henry Hart and 
Paul Freund objected to those appointments.19 In the wake of 
these objections the Senate held hearings, the result of which 
was a resolution saying that the President ought not to make re-
cess appointments to the bench.20 As shown by this sampling of 
history, the historiography deployed in Woodley, because of its 
lack of focus, is not as neat as it might seem. 
All things considered, the variance between the recess ap-
pointments clause and Article III seems best ironed either by 
reconciling underlying purposes, as done by the dissent in United 
States v. Woodley or better yet, as I shall explain, by a text-based 
and rights-oriented solution to the problem. In any event, history 
should not here be the guide. But if history is taken as the guide, 
the question may remain a close one. It may be close not be-
cause of appointments to the Supreme Court, here there is too 
little history and too much opposition in the history there is. 
Rather, the question may be close because of a history of which 
little if anything has been known or reported, this history being 
that of recess appointments not to the Supreme Court but to the 
lower courts. This history is reported below. And as it must 
given the current reliance on history in these matters, much of 
this article is, regrettably, about identifying and untangling the 
history used to support recess appointments to the bench. 
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND THE TERMS, 
RIGHTS, AND PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III 
On September 7, 1787, the constitutional convention in 
Philadelphia was about a week shy of completing its work. That 
Friday, a tired group of delegates finally settled a longstanding 
question about selecting high federal officers. The decision was 
that the appointment of these officers would be shared by the 
President and the Senate. Governeur Morris explained, "as the 
President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as 
19. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL RECORD at 1 (Oct. 8, 1953) (comments of Professors 
Henry Hart, Paul Freund, Benjamin Kaplan, Ernest Brown, and Arthur Sutherland). See 
text at n.73, infra. 
20. S. Res. 334, 106 CONG. REC. 18145. The floor debate is at 106 CONG. REC. 
18130 ff. See also Report, Recess Appointments of Federal Judges, House Committee of 
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). 
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the Senate was to concur, there would be security.'m Accord-
ingly, Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States." 
As soon as the "appointments clause" was agreed to, Rich-
ard Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina moved that "the President 
shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during 
the recess of the Senate by granting Commissions which shall 
expire at the end of the next Session of the Senate. "22 Such de-
bate as there may have been is not recorded. The motion, 
though, was immediately approved. Accordingly, in Article II 
the appointments clause and its condition of Senate advice and 
consent are followed by the proviso (set in the precise terms of 
Spaight's motion) that "The President shall have Power to fill up 
all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by 
granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their next 
Session." 
In public debate on the Constitution, comment on the recess 
appointments clause is slight to nonexistent. In Federalist No. 67, 
however, Alexander Hamilton provided a cogent description of 
the clause and its purposes, as follows: 
The ordinary power of appointments is confided to the Presi-
dent and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised 
during the session of the Senate; but as it would have im-
proper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the 
appointment of officers, and as vacancies might happen dur-
ing their recess, which it might be necessary for the public ser-
vice to fill up without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently 
intended to authorize the President, singly, to make tempo-
rary appointments "during the recess of the Senate, by grant-
ing commissions which shall expire at the end of their next 
session. "23 
21. The Supreme Court has explained the "security" thus provided: "The Presi-
dent's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded, 
however, as Article II further requires the 'Advice and Consent of the Senate.' This 
serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power ... and 'to promote a 
judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union."' Edmond v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 651,659-60 (1997). 
22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1798, at 
539 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 377-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1999) (emphasis in original). 
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Originally, recesses between sessions were in fact long: The first 
ten recesses averaged seven months in length. In those several 
months there might be a vacancy in office that if left unfilled 
would impair the public service. Given the poor communication 
and transportation by horseback along bad roads, reconvening 
the Senate was out of the question. Quite sensibly, the President 
always on the job would if needed fill the vacated office by a 
temporary appointment. 
A matter of greater moment at the constitutional conven-
tion was that of establishing the "judicial power of the United 
States." The Declaration of Independence had charged that the 
English King "made judges dependent on his will alone for the 
tenure of their office."24 The autonomy promised in that declara-
tion is kept by Article III as it provides judges with lifetime ten-
ure and pay protection. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton explained 
that owing to its "natural feebleness" the judiciary "is in contin-
ual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its 
coordinate branches." Against this threat "nothing," Hamilton 
said, "can contribute so much to [the !udiciary's] firmness and 
independency as permanency in office." 5 
A little less well known, perhaps, is this additional part of 
Federalist No. 78, wherein Hamilton explained that a faithful at-
tendance to individual rights "can certainly not be expected from 
judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission." In 
this respect, he further noted, "Periodical appointments, how-
ever regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or 
other, be fatal to their necessary independence."26 Be that as it 
may, Hamilton in his significant account of the recess appoint-
ments clause, explained that "as vacancies might happen during 
[the Senate's] recess, which it might be necessary for the public 
service to fill up without delay, the [appointment clause] is evi-
dently intended to authorize the President ... to make tempo-
rary appointments."27 The question raised by these accounts, of 
course is: How are the "temporary appointments" of the recess 
appointments to be squared with "temporary commissions" 
inimical to Article III? 
24. Declaration of Independence, '113 (1776). 
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999). 
26. Id. at 439 (emphasis added). 
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999) (emphasis added). 
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Not readily. Respecting recess appointments, Article II, sec-
tion 2 clause 3 flatly states that "The President shall have the 
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess 
of the Senate" and does so without allowance for judges. As 
flatly, Article III states that judges "shall hold their offices dur-
ing good Behavior" and does so without allowance for recess 
appointees. For any number of people, including the judges in 
United States v. Woodley, these terms established an impasse 
that cannot be broken by textual analyses.28 However, textual 
impasse, as I shall discuss, is not necessarily the case. For the 
moment, though, let us assume that such impasse is the case. But 
with impasse thus the case, it does not follow that the conflict be-
tween the recess appointments clause and Article III evades 
resolution. 
A. RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF PURPOSES 
In the rare circumstance where constitutional provisions are 
hopelessly at odds, the interpretational process does not stop; it 
cannot stop when resolution of a case requires resolution of the 
conflict. As interpretation thus proceeds, it may usefully do so 
according to the canon that "[constitutional] principles" must be 
considered as "of equal dignity, and ... must [not] be so en-
forced as to nullify or substantially impair another."29 Brought to 
bear on recess appointments to the bench, analysis under this 
canon shows that the independence of the judiciary can be pro-
tected without much (if at all) impairing presidential power un-
der the recess appointments clause. In 1787, when Senate re-
cesses were expected to be long and in fact were, there might be 
a vacated post that if left unfilled would be detrimental to the 
public service. Today, intersession recesses average not seven 
months but four weeks or so. In these few weeks there is no seat 
that if left unfilled for a few weeks would do much damage to 
the public service, and this is particularly so as regards the 
bench. Article III judges can be transferred from one court to 
the other to cover vacancies as they might occur. For these and 
other reasons, an able constitutional lawyer, Senator Sam Ervin 
(in debate on the Senate's 1960 resolution against recess ap-
pointments to the bench) explained, "there is, really, no crying 
28. As explained in Woodley, "while Article III speaks specifically about the tenure 
of federal judges, Article II is equally specific in addressing the manner of their appoint-
ment. There is therefore no reason to favor one Article over the other." 751 F.2d at 1010. 
29. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340,353 (1908). 
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need for the President to make a recess appointment or for hav-
ing the recess appointee take office." 30 
No purpose of the recess appointment clause is served by an 
appointment to the bench. However, each and every case de-
cided by the recess appointee does considerable damage to the 
Article III right to be heard by a judge free of political domina-
tion. 
B. TEXTUAL RESOLUTION- IN TERMS OF 
RIGHTS-OF THE CONFLICT 
Such conflict as exists between Article III and the recess 
appointments can be resolved, as above, by comparing the pur-
poses of the two provisions. It does not follow, though, that this 
is the optimal means of resolution. Despite misgivings as in the 
Woodley case, textual resolution of the conflict is possible, which 
resolution is consistent with case law already in place and is il-
luminating and serving respecting the values underlying Article 
III and the public policies underlying the recess appointments 
clause. 
What is this textual solution? To be sure, if here one looks 
for an explicit solution, a piece of text by which the one constitu-
tional provision allows for the other, resolution cannot be had. 
But then, resolution by reference to explicit textual aids is not to 
be expected, not under ordinary methods of constitutional inter-
pretation. As said by John Marshall, a Constitution cannot "par-
take of the prolixity of a legal code."31 Accordingly, Justice 
Scalia has explained that at points of intersection and conflict 
"the Appointments Clause does not (in the style of the Uniform 
Commercial Code) contain an explicit cross-reference to Article 
III."32 Per Scalia's point, the absence of such aids does not mean 
that a dissonance between Article III and the President's ap-
pointment powers cannot be worked out. Rather, it simply 
bumps the interpretational work to a more conceptuallevel.33 At 
30. 106 CONG. REC. 18142-43. Sen. Ervin's remarks here are worth reading. He 
showed, by examining the district courts, the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, 
that for none of them is any purpose of the recess appointments clause served by recess 
appointments to the bench. As regards transfers of judges to cover vacated posts, the dis-
senting judges in the Woodley case made the same point as Ervin, saying "interdistrict or 
intercircuit assignments provide an expedient and effective way of dealing with a short-
term problem." 751 F.2d at 1024. 
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819). 
32. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,901 (1991). 
33. For Scalia in the Freytag case, the higher generality was structural. It was to 
"examine the Appointments Clause of the Constitution in light of the 'cognate provi-
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this level a difference in quality of between the requirements of 
Article III and the provision of the recess appointments clause is 
evident. The clause provides for a discretionary power: The 
President may or may not cover a vacancy by means of recess 
appointment. In comparison, the judicial autonomy provided by 
Article III is stated as a mandate: The terms are that "Judges, 
both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices 
during good behavior." In constitutional design, hard and fast 
language of this sort operates as a check on discretionary power. 
For instance, the First Amendment states, "Congress shall 
make no laws ... abridging the freedom of speech." In opera-
tion, this provision checks the various (discretionary) powers 
granted Congress by Article I. However, this restraint thus im-
posed is not absolute. Instead, the right to free speech is pro-
tected by putting Congress to a high burden of justification for a 
curtailment of the right.34 As congressional power is thus ad-
justed to the "shall not" of the First Amendment, so should 
presidential power under the recess appointments clause be ad-
justed to the "shall hold their offices during good Behavior" 
terms of Article III. The first step in this adjustment has been 
accomplished; the courts have, out of Article Ill, established the 
right to a judge free of political domination. In turn, this right 
should-as do First Amendment rights-check recess appoint-
ments to the bench, by requiring that for these and only these 
appointments the President meet a certain burden of justifica-
tion. 
This burden can be calculated according to the parsimony 
usually referred to as Occam's razor. Presently, the burden need 
be no more than to insist that a recess appointment to the bench 
be compelled by the urgency on which the recess appointments 
clause is in fact based. This urgency, of course, is the harm to the 
public service caused by leaving unfilled a vacancy created dur-
ing a recess of the Senate, which urgency and which burden does 
no more than to confine presidential power to the terms and 
purposes of the recess appointments clause. What would be 
eliminated from the power, and removed only for appointments 
to the bench, is the various accretions to it that have built up 
over time, accretions such as appointments outside the plain 
sions' of which it is a central feature: Article I, Article II, and Article Ill." /d. 
34. For example, in the context of electoral activities, the burden is that of an "exacting 
scrutiny" under which a restriction is permissible only if "it is narrowly tailored to serve an 
overriding state interest." Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,347 (1995). 
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terms of the clause and for no reason other than to establish a 
placeholder's claim to the office. 
C. THE CASE LAW THAT ESTABLISHES THE RIGHT 
Reconciliation of the terms of Article III with those of the 
recess appointments clause is sustained by what I have to this 
point more or less asserted as an Article III right to a judge freed 
of political domination. Now it is appropriate to establish the 
bona fides of this right. An original expression of it is that of 
Federalist No. 78, as follows: "That inflexible and uniform ad-
herence to the rights of the Constitution and of individuals, 
which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, 
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices 
by a temporary commission."35 The same point-now in opposi-
tion to a recess appointment to the bench-came to be made in 
the Senate: "Since the provision for lifetime tenure for Federal 
judges is clearly for the benefit of litigants rather than for the 
benefit of the judges themselves, this provision must be regarded 
as one of the constitutional guarantees of civil rights, and this 
right of a trial before a lifetime judge or judges is as much a right 
of every litigant as his right of trial by jury in criminal cases."36 
Of course, a "right of a trial before a lifetime judge" is most 
authoritatively established by the courts. In Glidden v. Zdanok/7 
judges from the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals had been assigned to the circuit courts of ap-
peals. Litigants then claimed that the participation of these 
judges in their cases denied them "the protection of judges with 
tenure and compensation guaranteed by Article Ill. "38 The Su-
preme Court denied this contention inasmuch as "the Court of 
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are courts 
created under Article III" and judges from these courts "are and 
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter cd., 
1999). 
36. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Sen. Jud. Comm., Ex. Report No. 2, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess., at 2, 7 (Apr. 29, 1959). By reference to the work of John Marshall, the modem 
Supreme Court has made much the same point. "A judge's decision may affect an indi-
vidual's 'property, his reputation, his life, his all.' In the 'exercise of these duties,' the 
judge must 'observe the utmost fairness.' The judge must be 'perfectly and completely 
independent, with nothing to influence or contro(l] him but God and his conscience."' 
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 569 (2001), quoting Proceedings and Debates of 
the Virginia State Convention, of 1829-1830,616, 619 (1830). 
37. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
38. !d. at 533. 
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have been protected in tenure and compensation. "39 While the 
Court thus found that the right had not been violated, the exis-
tence of the right, to be heard by judges "protected in tenure and 
compensation" is implicit in the ~inion. In Northern Pipeline 
Canst. Co, v. Marathon Pipe Line, the right implicit in Glidden 
won out, causing the Court to overturn the Bankruptcy Act of 
1978. 
Northern Pipe Line had sued Marathon in federal bank-
ruptcy court for damages for breach of contract. Under the 1978 
Act, bankruptcy judges did not have life-tenure; rather, they 
were appointed for fourteen-year terms. This being the case, 
Marathon moved to dismiss the suit against it, on the grounds 
that the 1978 Act "unconstitutionally conferred Art. III judicial 
power upon judges who lacked life tenure and protection against 
salary diminution."41 In reviewing this motion, the Supreme 
Court started with this premise: '"A Judiciary free from control 
by the Executive and Legislature is essential if there is a right to 
have claims decided by judges who are free from potential 
domination by other branches of government.'"42 Because bank-
ruptcy judges did not have the requisite tenure and pay protec-
tions, the Court then held that Congress had unconstitutionally 
placed "judicial Power" in these judges and in doing so had de-
nied that right. Which holding of course forces this question: If a 
bankruptcy judge with a fourteen-year appointment and holding 
only some of the judicial power cannot exercise that power, how 
can a recess appointee with a one-year term be invested with all 
of the judicial power? 
Following the Northern Pipeline case, the Court in Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor43 examined whether and why 
Congress might assign some part of the judicial power to adminis-
trative agencies. In this effort, the Court assessed the "purposes" of 
Article III and in doing so identified two. One purpose was struc-
tural, which the Court described as the "public function" of 
checking the other parts of government as they might try to ex-
pand their power beyond constitutionally assigned limits.44 The 
other purpose was personal, that of a "personal guarantee of an 
independent and impartial adjudication," which guarantee the 
39. /d. at 532, 584. 
40. 458 u.s. 50 (1982). 
41. /d. at 56. 
42. /d. at 57 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,217-18 (1980)). 
43. 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
44. /d. at 847. 
2003-04] RECESS APPOINTMENTS 529 
Court described as the "personal right" to "have claims decided 
before judges who are free from potential domination by other 
branches of government."45 
Currently, the right to a judge free of political domination 
gains strong support from the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in 
Nguyen v. United States. 46 Defendants in a criminal case had ap-
pealed their conviction in a territorial court, the District Court of 
Guam, to the Ninth Circuit. That circuit then affirmed the con-
viction. However, the panel that heard the appeal consisted of 
two Article III judges plus a territorial judge selected from the 
South Pacific region that had been the site of the trial. This judge 
had been placed on the panel under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), which 
provides, "The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign 
one or more district judges within the circuit to sit upon the 
court of appeals ... whenever the business of that court so re-
quires." The territorial judge thus selected had been appointed 
to the bench for a term of ten years, within which term the judge 
could be removed by the President "for cause. "47 Because he 
lacked lifetime tenure, the territorial judge that heard defen-
dants' appeal was not an Article III judge, a matter defendants 
raised (for the first time) in their petition for review of that deci-
sion by the Supreme Court. 
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners argued (1) their con-
stitutional right to be heard only by Article III judges and (2) 
certain statutory grounds. The Court found for the petitioners on 
the statutory grounds. It held that the act, 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), 
under which the territorial judge had been assigned to the Ninth 
Circuit panel allowed for assignments of only Article III judges 
to the circuit courts. For the Court, Justice Stephens referred to 
"Congress' decision to preserve the Article III character of the 
courts of appeals" and found that "Section 292(a) does not per-
mit any assignment to the courts of appeals of a district judge 
who does not enjoy the protections set forth in Article III. "48 
45. !d. 
46. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003). 
47. The court from which the territorial judge had been selected, the District Court 
for the Northern Marianna Islands, was an Article I court, established by Congress pur-
suant to its authority to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States." 123 S. Ct. at 2134-35. 
48. !d. at 2137. The decision was 5-4. However, the dissenting justices agreed that a 
non-Article III judge could not be assigned to the Article III court. They dissented be-
cause the petitioners while knowing that the Ninth Circuit panel included a non-Article 
III judge had without objection briefed and argued their case before that panel. Only 
after they lost did they object by means of their petition for Supreme Court review. The 
dissent was therefore of the opinion that petitioners had waived their right to complain of 
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Accordingly, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit proceeding be-
cause it included the non-Article III judge. Having thus disposed 
of the case on statutory grounds, the Court as a matter of course 
did not address the petitioner's constitutional arguments.49 But 
considering that the statutory decision was underwritten by the 
"strong policy" (derived from Article III) of reserving federal 
courts for Article III judges, the decision considerably supports 
the constitutional ri~ht (derived from Article III) to a politically 
independent judge.5 
D. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS: THE EX PARTE WARD 
AND WOODLEY CASES 
A recess appointee gains a temporary appointment, good 
only until the end of the next Senate session. Whether the ap-
pointee gains a permanent commission depends (1) on whether 
in that next session the President nominates the appointee for a 
permanent commission and (2) on whether the Senate then con-
firms that nomination. In these circumstances, the appointee re-
mains subject to political pressures.51 These pressures might not 
at all influence a judge's handling of a trial. Or consciously or 
the composition of the panel. /d. at 2139. 
49. The Court stated, "Petitioners contend that the participation of an Article IV 
judge on the panel violated structural constitutional guarantees embodied in Article III 
and in the Appointments Clause, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. We find it unnec-
essary to discuss the constitutional questions because the statutory violation is clear." 
2135 at n.9. Nguyen thus seems an application of the canon that " 'where an otherwise 
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the 
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress."' Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 
u.s. 159,173 (2001). 
50. Moreover, this policy, as Nguyen showed, is exceptionally strong. The Court 
found that the violation of it was not subject to waiver, as by the petitioner's failure 
timely to object to the non-Article III judge. Nor could the violation be excused by an 
assertion of no prejudicial error. The count of no prejudicial error was that the three-
judge panel that upheld the petitioners' conviction had done so unanimously. Therefore, 
the decision was supported by two Article III judges who provided the majority upon 
which the decision could be upheld. But as against allowing a judge without the tenure 
provided by Article III to sit on a court constituted under this Article, the government's 
argument of prejudicial error was to be of no avail. 123 S. Ct. at 2138. 
51. As found by the original panel in Woodley, "a judge will scarcely be oblivious to 
the effect his decision may have on the vote of these officials." 726 F.2d. at 1330. That the 
on-the-bench performance of a recess appointee will indeed be reviewe<l by the Senate is 
indicated by the confirmation debate on Judge Gregory, where it was noted that "His 
performance on the bench since his [recess] appointment has been uniformly praised." 
147 CONG. REC. S7988 (July 20, 2001). Also, it was noted, by Sen. Warner of Virginia, 
"Many, if not all, Senators are concerned about judicial activism. The judicial's special 
role is to interpret the law, not make law. Judge Gregory assured me he will follow this 
traditional role." !d. at S7990. 
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unconsciously, the judge might be influenced: She might act in a 
politically correct way or, instead, she might, by bracing herself 
against the pressure, overreact in the opposite direction.52 
Whether these pressures in fact influence a decision in these 
ways is usually neither provable nor disprovable, which is a rea-
son that Article III precludes this influence be it real or poten-
tial. Accordingly, as expressed by the Court the right to a judge 
free of political domination specifically precludes the "potential" 
of such domination. The right is to "have claims decided before 
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches 
of government. "53 
That a recess appointee is subject to the "potential domina-
tion" of the President and Senate is, then, a self-evident state-
ment of fact. This fact was first asserted in 1899 in Ex Parte 
Ward. 54 Here, the defendant in a criminal case used the writ of 
habeas corpus to ask that his conviction be overturned because 
the judge who convicted him had not been "authorized to exer-
cise any portion of the judicial power."55 Before the Supreme 
Court, his argument was that "the president could not during the 
recess of the Senate and without its concurrence, by his commis-
sion invest an appointee with any portion of the judicial power 
of the U.S. Government as defined in Article III of the Constitu-
tion, because that article requires that judges of the U.S. courts 
shall hold their office during good behavior. "56 
That argument was well stated. Nonetheless, the Court de-
clined to hear it on the grounds, good at the time, that the power 
of a "de facto" judge could not be challenged. "De facto" meant 
that the court (as opposed to the judge) otherwise had jurisdic-
tion and this jurisdiction was sufficient to validate a decision. 
Today, though, at least for claims that judges do not have proper 
Article III credentials, the Supreme Court has done away with 
52. In the 1960 debate on recess appointments to the bench, Senator Hart noted: A 
litigant may "for the rest of his life wonder" whether an appointee had succumbed to 
pressure from the Senate or the President or had instead "rear[ed] back and ben[t] the 
other way in order to prove that he was not subservient to such pressure." 106 CONG. 
REC. 18134 (1960). For an account, of the possibilities and subtleties of this influence see 
Judge Norris's dissenting opinion in the Woodley case. 751 F.2d at 1022-23. 
53. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) 
(emphasis added); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530, 533 (1963) ("Article 
III, sec.l, however, is explicit and gives the petitioners a basis for complaint without re-
quiring them to point to particular instances of mistreatment in the record"). 
54. 173 u.s. 452 (1899). 
55. !d. at 454. 
56. !d. at 453-54. 
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this doctrine. In Glidden v. Zdanok,57 where litigants asserted 
that an assignment of judges from the Court of Claims and the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to circuit courts of ap-
peals denied them "the protection of judges with tenure and 
compensation guaranteed by Article III," the government 
claimed that this assertion of right was barred by the de facto 
judge doctrine.58 The Court rejected this claim, finding that that 
while the doctrine was usefully concerned with the efficiencies 
gained by protecting judgments from collateral attack, these effi-
ciencies were not of such weight as to preclude a court from de-
termining whether a judge not fully qualified under Article III 
could decide cases. Specifically, the Court ruled that the doctrine 
does not apply to "basic constitutional protections designed in 
part for the benefit of litigants," which protections included the 
right to a judge free of political domination. 59 
Accordingly, when this was asserted in United States v. 
Woodley, the "de facto judge" doctrine was no longer a bar. The 
facts of Woodley were that ahead of turning over his office to 
President-elect Reagan, President Carter placed Judge Walter 
Heen on the bench by means of a recess appointment. Judge 
Heen then presided over the trial and conviction of Janet Wood-
ley on drug charges. In Ms. Woodley's appeal from that convic-
tion, the Ninth Circuit on its own motion questioned whether 
Ms. Woodley's conviction had been consistent with her right to 
be heard by an autonomous court, because "[a] judge receiving 
his commission under the recess appointments clause may be 
called upon to make politically charged decisions while his 
nomination awaits approval by popularly elected officials."60 Fol-
lowing what it found to be controlling Supreme Court precedent 
(Glidden and Marathon), the court then vacated the lower court 
decision. On the government's strong urging, the Ninth Circuit 
then reheard the case en bane. 
En bane, the circuit split 7 to 4. The dissenting judges, as we 
have said, would have decided the case by identifying and then 
reconciling the purposes underlying the recess appointments 
clause and Article III. This decisional process was altogether 
proper and fitting. It entailed an analysis of constitutional struc-
ture so as not to warp it. Giving due consideration to the pur-
pose of recess appointments, that of not rendering an office dys-
57. 370 u.s. 530 (1962). 
58. ld. at 533. 
59. /d. at 535-36; see also Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130,2135-37 (2003). 
60. 726 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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functional for not being promptly filled, the dissenters' found 
that no such dysfunction called for Judge Heen's appointment. 
On the other hand, the Article III value in judges freed from po-
litical domination was substantially breached as Judge Heen un-
dertook to hear cases prior to Senate confirmation. 
The majority did not dispute these conclusions by the dis-
sent; rather, it ignored them. As charged by the dissent, the ma-
jority simply "omit[ted] the step of weighing competing values, 
resulting in a truncated analysis almost entirely based on histori-
cal analysis."61 On the basis of a surely truncated history, the ma-
jority found "an unbroken" acceptance of a practice of recess 
appointments to the bench and found that this practice now con-
trolled the constitutional scheme of things. This resort to history 
seriously complicates present studies. As said by Judge Norris in 
his dissent in Woodley: 
Thus, could we set historical practice aside, I believe our deci-
sion today would be relatively easy .... [T]he principle that 
animate the salary and tenure provisions of Article III-
judicial independence and separation of powers-clearly out-
weigh the concerns of expediency and efficiency that underlie 
the Recess Appointments Clause. In other words, if we were 
writing on a clean slate, if we were reviewing Judge Heen's 
recess commission without history to support it, I find it in-
conceivable that we would interpret the Constitution as the 
majority does today-subordinating Article III values to the 
executive's general power to make recess appointments.62 
But because the majority in the one full dress decision in this 
area did find history determinative, history cannot now be ig-
nored and to it we turn. 
II. THE HISTORY RESPECTING THE RIGHT 
By itself an executive practice may be nothing more than an 
extended usurpation of power. 63 The checks and balances pro-
vided by the Constitution can, however, help determine whether 
usurpation or legitimacy is the case. Oppositinn by Congress or 
the courts helps to identify usurpation; their acquiescence helps 
61. 751 F.2d 1008, 1020 (9th Cir. 1985). 
62. !d. at 1024 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
63. The prominent authority that a historical practice in and of itself cannot alter 
the power held by a branch of government is, of course, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983), where a sustained congressional practice of "legislative vetoes" did not save that 
practice from being overturned by the Supreme Court. 
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to mark legitimacy.64 Accordingly, the majority in Woodley ad-
duced history that it said showed "an unbroken acceptance of the 
President's use of the recess power to appoint federal judges by 
the three branches of government."65 That his'i:ory, though, is de-
ficient in that it did not in fact show an "acceptance" by the 
other branches, not of the practice actually in question. This 
practice was not recess appointments per se but whether a recess 
appointee's hearing of a case prior to his confirmation violated 
the litigant's right to be heard by a judge freed of political pres-
sure. A history of recess appointments to the bench is one thing; 
a history of those appointees hearing cases prior to confirmation 
is something else. This point in mind, we now review the history. 
A. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 
The practice of recess appointments to the bench is com-
monly said to have begun with that of John Rutledge in 1795. 
These accounts are substantially but not perfectly correct. The 
first such appointment, which incidentally involved Rutledge, 
occurred four years earlier in 1791. In its first term, the Supreme 
Court met for ten days and heard no cases. John Rutledge was a 
member of that Court, although he was, as he said, disappointed 
at not being appointed Chief Justice. After that Term Rutledge 
resigned to become Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme 
Court. George Washington filled his vacated seat by what was 
the first recess appointment, that of Thomas Johnson in 1791. 
This appointment was confirmed six weeks later, well before 
Johnson heard any cases. 
When John Jay resigned as Chief Justice in 1795, Rutledge 
wrote President Washington to say that while it would be unbe-
coming for him to apply for that position he was indeed avail-
able. Washington quickly replied, telling Rutledge that the Chief 
Justice seat was his. Inasmuch as the Senate was then deep in its 
recess, this appointment was a recess appointment. Owing to 
some combination of Rutledge's impolitic remarks and a percep-
tion of unfitness, this appointment was not well received. Just 
64. Thus Frankfurter, in his classic statement of the gloss-of-history method of con-
stitutional interpretation, referred to an "executive practice, long pursued to the knowl-
edge of the Congress." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 
(1952) (concurring); see also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) 
("the long, continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a 
presumption that the withdrawals had been ma~e in pursuance of its consent or of a 
recognized administrative power of the Executive m the management of the pubhc 
lancti5). 751 F.2d at 1011 (emphasis added). 
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before Rutledge took his seat on the bench, he publicly spoke 
against the "Jay Treaty" with Great Britain. This treaty was dear 
to the Federalist majority in the Senate and they fell on 
Rutledge with some vehemence, as shown by this letter from At-
torney General Bradford to Alexander Hamilton: "That crazy 
speech of Mr. Rutledge, joined to certain information that he is 
daily sinking into debility of mind and body, will probably pre-
vent him receiving the appointment." It did. When the Senate 
convened, it rejected his nomination. In the meantime, Rutledge, 
by means of his temporary appointment, took his seat with the 
Court and participated in two decisions. After the Senate re-
fused to confirm his nomination, Rutledge resigned without fin-
ishing the term to which he had been appointed, saying he felt 
unsuited to the position.66 
Fifty-six years passed, and then Benjamin Curtis was the 
next recess appointee to hear cases before he was confirmed. He 
was appointed by Millard Fillmore on September 22, 1851, was 
sworn in October 10, and then was on the bench for twenty days 
before he was confirmed. In that brief period, though, he par-
ticipated in two decisions. When Curtis accepted his appoint-
ment, he wrote the President that he wished to assume his circuit 
duties as soon as possible, owing to "a term on the Circuit Court 
at Boston ... at which my presence is very desirable."67 The 
pressing matter at Boston seems to have been "The Fugitive 
Slave Trials." A "young man of color, who was a member of the 
bar" had been indicted under the Fugitive Slave Law because he 
had participated in the "forcible rescue" (from the marshal's of-
fice at the federal court in Boston) of an escaped slave. Local 
feeling ran high in favor of that young man. Under his temporary 
appointment, Justice Curtis presided over his trial, in which he 
made an unpopular ruling against "jury nullification." Defen-
dant's counsel had asked Curtis to instruct the jury that it might 
disregard the Fugitive Slave Law if it found that statute to be un-
constitutional. Curtis refused to do so. The defendant, however, 
was not convicted, in part because of favorable rulings by Curtis 
on evidentiary matters. 68 
66. His words, in his letter of resignation, were that "it takes a Constitution less 
broken than mine." Louis Fisher, Recess Appointments of Judges 14, Cong. Research 
Serv. Report for Cong. (2002); see 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY, 127-29, 131, 133, 137 (1922). 
67. THE LIFE AND WRITING OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS 156 (1879). 
68. United States v. Robert Morris, 26 F.Cas. 1323 (1851) (No. 15,815); see LIFE 
AND WRITING OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, supra note 67, at 160-63; 1 WARREN, 
supra note 66, at 500-03. 
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Justice Curtis was known as person of considerable integ-
rity, unlikely to be swayed by political or popular pressure, 
which did not mean he was not subject to such pressure because 
he was not yet confirmed. Some indication of this pressure was 
given at a memorial service on Curtis's death. One of the pre-
senters that day was Richard Dana. Apart fro:::n giving his name, 
Curtis's biography does not identify Mr. Dana. However, in the 
Federal Cases report of The Fugitive Slave Trials, counsel for the 
defendant is listed as "R.H. Dana."69 "About twenty-two years 
ago," said Dana at Justice Curtis's memorial, "the bar, the politi-
cal world, the public were extremely excited by the Fugitive 
Slave trials." Justice Curtis, though, "conduct[ed] the trials with 
impartiality," and, indeed, with an "affirmative determination 
that the trials should be done with absolute fairness." That de-
termination was to Dana all the more remarkable because it was 
exerted against a certain pressure: "And they who remember how 
things stood in Washington in those days will see the force of the 
suggestion that Judge Curtis had not been confirmed by the Sen-
ate, but was acting upon an executive appointment made during a 
recess of the Senate. "70 
A century passed in which three recess appointments were 
made to the Supreme Court. None of these appointees, Justices 
Davis, Harlan, and Holmes, heard cases prior to their confirma-
tion. In time, the fact that they had not heard cases prior to their 
confirmation was declared to be good practice. In 1937 and un-
der the threat of a recess appointment to the Court by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, a point of objection raised in the Senate 
was that heretofore Justices had not "taken their seats upon the 
bench until they have been confirmed by the Senate of the 
United States." Were an unconfirmed judge to decide a case, 
that action, it was said, "would seriously reflect upon the ethical 
standard of the nominee. "71 On that occasion the following reso-
lution was submitted to the Senate: "That it is the sense of the 
Senate that an appointment to the Supreme Court should be 
made only at such time as the Senate may act upon confirmation 
69. 26 F.Cas. at 1323 (No. 15,815). 
70. LIFE AND WRITING OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, supra note 67, at 162-63 
(emphasis in original). 
71. 81 CONG. REc. 8002 (1937). There were several other expressions of ethical 
concerns. E.g., "I don't think any self-respecting lawyer would ... serve as a member of 
the Supreme Court of the United States during the interim before being confirmed by 
the Senate. /d. at 7995. The fact that Holmes had not taken his seat prior to confirmation 
was seen as "a clear ethical demonstration ... there ought not to be ... any sitting Jus-
tices who have not been confirmed." /d. at 8000. 
2003-04) RECESS APPOINTMENTS 537 
prior the entry of the nominee upon his service."72 No vote was 
taken, though, probably because President Roosevelt drew back 
from the threatened appointment. 
Twenty years later President Eisenhower made his recess 
appointments to the Supreme Court. Why he chose this route of 
appointments is, so far as I know, unknown. But starting with 
Warren, the three justices he appointed commenced to hear and 
decide cases before the Senate confirmed their tenure. No one 
suggested that the prospects of confirmation in any way swayed 
these Justices in these cases. Be that as it may, the idea that un-
confirmed judges are subject to unacceptable political pressures 
came to the fore. For instance, Professor Henry Hart objected to 
Earl Warren's appointment as follows: 
Governor Warren cannot possible have this independence if 
his every vote, indeed his every question from the bench, is 
subject to the possibility of inquiry in later committee hear-
ings and floor debates to determine his fitness to continue in 
judicial office .... The point is not what Governor Warren 
and his friends will think about his disinterestedness but what 
defeated litigants will think .... 73 
Thereafter, Senator Joseph McCarthy rudely illustrated "the 
possibility of inquiry." During Justice Brennan's confirmation 
hearings the Senator asked him how he felt about "rooting out 
subversives." Justice Brennan replied, "Will you forgive me an 
embarrassment, Senator. You will appreciate that I am a sitting 
Justice of the Court. There are presently pending before the 
Court some cases in which I believe will have to be decided the 
question what is communism."74 
At Justice Stewart's confirmation hearing, the case that re-
cess appointees should not hear cases prior to Senate confirma-
tion assumed its modern form, that of a violation of a core con-
stitutional right. The dissent to Justice Stewart's confirmation 
argued as follows: 
No man can be a Federal judge until he has been appointed 
and commissioned to serve during good behavior. ... Since 
the provision for lifetime tenure for Federal judges is clearly 
for the benefit of litigants rather than for the benefit of the 
72. !d. at 7963. The Senate opposition to Roosevelt's thre;,t of a recess appointment 
is further discussed at supra notes 100-103. 
73. 17 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL RECORD 1-3 (Oct. 8, 1953). 
74. Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr., Sen. Jud. Comm. 17 (85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1957). 
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judges themselves, this provision must be regarded as one of 
the constitutional guarantees of civil rights, and this right of a 
trial before a lifetime judge or judges is as much a ri~ht of 
every litigant as his right of trial by jury in criminal cases. 5 
This objection-grounded in the "right of a trial before a 
lifetime judge"-was studiously made, possibly owing to the 
groundwork of a Senate Judiciary Committee study, delivered 
January 19, 1959, on "Recess Appointments and Federal 
Judges."76 This lengthy report delineated the conflict between 
recess appointments and judicial independence and tried to iden-
tify what the Senate might do to alleviate the conflict. And here 
was the rub: Exactly what could the Senate do? Presidential 
power under the recess appointments clause is exercised without 
Senate participation and for this reason seems beyond constraint 
by that body. (One thing Congress can do and has done, though, 
is to refuse to pay an officer improperly appointed under the re-
cess appointments clause.)77 
On that occasion what the Senate did do was as follows. Af-
ter the Stewart confirmation hearings, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee submitted the following resolution to the Senate: 
That it is the sense of the Senate that the making of recess ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court of the United States may 
not be wholly consistent with the best interest of the Supreme 
Court, the nominee who may be involved, the litigants before 
the Court, nor indeed, the people of the United States, and 
that such appointments, therefore, should not be made except 
under unusual circumstances and for the purpose of prevent-
ing a demonstrable breakdown in the administration of the 
Court's business.78 
While this resolution was directed to Supreme Court appointees, 
the debate on it addressed federal judges in general. Various 
questions were raised. One question was whether the Senate 
could forthrightly determine the qualifications of a nominee al-
ready on the bench. "It would be a little difficult," it was said, 
"with our attitude and our regard for the law, to have a man 
75. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Sen. Jud. Comm., Ex. Report No.2, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2, 7 (Apr. 29, 1959). 
76. House Judiciary Comm., Recess Appointments of Federal Judges, 86th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1959). The report was prepared by the committee staff and the American Law 
Division of the Library of Congress. 
77. See Tenure in Office Act, 28 U .S.C. § 5503 (2000); infra notes 98-99. 
78. S. Res. 334, 106 CONG. REC. 18,145 (1960). The floor debate is at 106 CONG. 
REC. 18,130. 
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walk into committee who is wearing the judicial robes, after 
seven or eight decisions, [and] be questioned with reference to 
his competency."79 
The next question was about the constitutionality (and pro-
priety) of a judge yet subject to the political pressure of confir-
mation sitting down to try cases. These ill-effects of these pres-
sures were described as follows: A litigant "may for the rest of 
his life wonder" whether his case was influenced, consciously or 
unconsciously, by the temporary judge's knowledge that he must 
please the President, so that he does not withdraw the judge's 
nomination, and the Senate, so that it confirms him. The judge 
might bend to these pressures or he might do the opposite; he 
"might rear back and bend the other way in order to prove that 
he was subservient to neither branch." Senator Ervin, himself a 
former state supreme court justice, identified these pressures as 
contrary to Article III, saying: 
[T)he third article of the Constitution ... clearly contemplates 
that the federal courts shall be presided over by judges who 
hold office for life .. ·.· Therefore, it is somewhat inconsistent 
with the spirit of the third article ... for a judge to make deci-
sions when he does not occupv his office for life but only until 
the next session of the Senate.1l0 
The resolution was then adopted by the Senate. 
B. LOWER COURT PRACTICE 
History, unfortunately, does not always generate a sharp 
resolution of a problem. In addition to the history above, of a 
pronounced opposition to Supreme Court appointees hearing 
cases prior to confirmation, there is also a heretofore unknown 
history respecting lower court appointments. This history blurs 
the sharper picture offered by appointments to the Supreme 
Courts. 
Nowhere, not in public debate, in Congress, in the courts, or 
in scholarly commentary has this lower court practice respecting 
recess appointments been previously presented, which inatten-
79. 106 CONG. REC. 18,136 (1960). The same objection had been made in the floor 
debate in 1937: "The Senate is not a free agent to pass upon the credentials of the nomi-
nee if the nominee ... has clothed himself with the robes of office, has participated in 
Court proceedings, deliberations and decisions ... and then comes before the Senate for 
confirmation." 81 CONG. REC. 7999 (1937) (Sen. Vandenberg) 
80. 106 CONG. REC. 18,143 (1960). 
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tion seems to have been because of a lack of records.81 It turns 
out, though, that there is a probably adequate database. In the 
Woodley cases, the Ninth Circuit ordered the Justice Depart-
ment to prepare a record of recess appointments to the federal 
courts, which record was then prepared and appended to the 
Department's brief in the case.8 That appendix lists recess ap-
pointments from the 1790s to Judge Heen in 1980 to the lower 
courts. That appendix, though, provides no information respect-
ing the question at hand, which is whether those judges, prior to 
being confirmed by the Senate, heard and decided cases. 
We can now derive the date that would enable us to answer 
this question. While the Justice Department-prepared index 
does not contain information itself sufficient to generate this an-
swer, it does supply a key: The index provides the dates that 
lower-court judges received their recess appointment and the 
dates they were confirmed. With these judges and these dates, 
common electronic databases can today be checked to see 
whether these judges signed and delivered any opinions in the 
period between their recess appointment and later Senate con-
firmation. This cross-checking shows that a significant number of 
them did hear cases prior to their confirmation. 
There have been 294 recess appointments to the lower 
courts. Roughly thirty-one percent of them heard and decided 
cases prior to their confirmation.83 Unlike the Supreme Court, 
81. For example, the Congressional Research Service has noted the lack of records: 
"Before July 1965 ... recess appointments were recorded in a haphazard fashion. Al-
though the Congressional Record is the best source ... it is neither complete nor wholly 
reliable." Memorandum, Government Division, Congressional Research Service, Library 
of Congress, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13, 
1985), quoted in Michael A. Carrier, Note, When is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of 
the Recess Appointments Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204,2209 n.31 (1994). 
82. Second Supplemental Brief for Appellee, United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 
1328 (9th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1028). The Justice Department prepared list of appointees 
and dates in large part from files maintained by the Deputy Attorney General. In other 
parts (appointments in the 1800s) that list had to be "reconstructed" from records origi-
nally kept by the State Department. 
83. These numbers should stand even if the records, as they surely are, are only 
roughly accurate. No complete central record of such appointments was kept and the 
Justice Department had to reconstruct some parts of its index from State Department 
files. Given its position in the Woodley case, the Justice Department would not likely 
under-report the number of recess appointments. Nor would electronic databases over-
report the number of opinions signed by these appointees prior to their confirmation. 
Therefore, combining the list of appointees with electronic convincingly shows that re-
cess appointees to the lower federal courts did hear a significant number of cases prior to 
the Senate confirmation of these judges. It is unlikely that unreported opinions would 
change this conclusion. An appendix, identifying the lower court judges and whether or 
not the judges so appointed heard cases prior to confirmation, can be obtained from the 
author at lawwtm@emory.edu. 
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there are not the same long gaps- the century between Curtis 
and the Eisenhower appointees- between recess appointees 
who heard cases prior to their confirmation. In the lower courts, 
the gaps of any significance are an initial thirty-four years (from 
1796 until 1828) when no recess appointees heard cases prior to 
their confirmation. From 1828 until 1891 there is a spattering 
(six) of recess appointees who heard cases before they were con-
firmed. From 1891 until 1980, there is, though, a steady drum-
beat of recess appointees hearing cases prior to confirmation, up 
until the contested fact of Judge Heen hearing a case in 1980. 
From Judge Heen's appointment until that of Judge Gregory in 
2000, there is a twenty-year gap. 
What are we to make of this record respecting lower court 
appointments? In trying to answer this question, we should keep 
in mind that the lower court practice is but one part of the puz-
zle; recess appointments to the Supreme Court are the other part 
and these appointments have been the subject of significant 
senatorial opposition. Also, if history is to be the guide we 
should focus on the key factor of ratification. Was the Senate 
aware of and did it acquiescence to these judges hearing cases 
prior to their confirmation? In the Senate, this lower court prac-
tice seems to have gone without remark if not entirely unnoticed. 
I find no reference to the practice in recorded debate. However, 
when President Eisenhower's Supreme Court appointees heard 
cases prior to their confirmation that fact was noticed, debated, 
and disapproved of in the Senate. That disapproval was in fact 
cast in general terms that included lower court judges, as in "it is 
somewhat inconsistent with the spirit of the third article ... for a 
judge to make decisions when he does not occuf)' his office for 
life but only until the next session of the Senate." 
Turning now to the courts we ask the same question: Has 
the judiciary ratified a practice of lower-court appointees hear-
ing cases prior to their confirmation? The courts will be silent 
until a case is brought.85 After the Supreme Court ruling in 1899 
in Ex Parte Ward, that the courts lacked jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether a trial by a recess appointee violated Article III, 
no such cases would likely be brought. None were, until the ju-
risdictional objection was eliminated and the stir generated by 
84. 106 CONG. REC. 18,143 (Sen. Ervin). 
85. As said by Judge Norris in United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1028-29 
(9th Cir. 1985), "Because the judicial branch is passive, it cannot to an assertion of power 
by the political branches until third parties present the courts with a concrete case or con-
troversy. Judicial silence simply cannot be construed as judicial acquiescence." 
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the Eisenhower appointees brought the right to the fore. There-
fore, those judges in Woodley who found that the courts were 
part of an "unbroken acceptance" of recess appointees deciding 
cases put the cart before the horse. These judges may have 
started a history of judicial assent but they could not have been 
relying on such a history because it did not then exist. 
III. THE HISTORY RESPECTING THE POWER 
The personal right to a judge free of political domination 
stands to check executive power under the recess appointments 
clause. Apart from this matter of right, previous to it actually, 
there is the separate question of whether, und.;!r the terms of the 
clause, there is such a power at all. The recess appointments 
clauses gives the President the power to fill vacancies "that may 
happen during the Recess of the Senate." Today, intersession re-
cesses have shrunk from an original seven months to four or five 
weeks. In these short recesses vacancies of any consequence are 
less likely to occur; consequently, there are few occasions for the 
power. However, the recess appointments clause has come into 
another and larger use, for appointments made not during a re-
cess but prior to the recess. Such was the case with the Clinton 
and Bush recess appointments to the bench. If the power to 
make appointments were made subject to, and then limited by, 
the "during the recess" terms of the clause, then for all practical 
purposes the power to make such appointments to the bench 
disappears. 
However, this particular text-based solution to the recess 
appointments to the bench is thought to be unavailable, on the 
grounds that history has enlarged the clause to include appoint-
ments to fill vacancies created prior to the recess in which they 
are made. This history is the subject of the next section. In this 
section, please keep in mind-as courts and commentators have 
not-that these materials, while they do relate, are not directly 
and primarily about the right to be heard by a judge free of po-
litical domination. Instead they are largely about the Senate pre-
rogative of advice and consent and whether a recess appoint-
ment that exceeds the power invested in the President by the 
recess appointments clause violates the "just rights of the Sen-
ate. "86 
86. E.g., 12 Op. Att'y Gen 32,41 (1861). 
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A. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS 
When Congress admitted Florida to the Union in 1845, it 
provided for a federal district court judge, a United States At-
torney, and a federal marshal for the new state. The Senate re-
cessed before these offices were filled, whereupon this question 
was presented to Attorney General Mason: "[h]ave you now, in 
the recess of the Senate, the power to appoint the district judge, 
the district attorney, and the marshal?" Mr. Mason's opinion was 
that the President lacked the power. "If vacancies are known to 
exist during the session of the Senate, and nominations are then 
made," he said, "they cannot be filled by recess appointments in 
the recess of the Senate."87 Inasmuch as these vacancies did not 
"happen during the recess of the Senate," they outran the power 
provided by the clause. However, this conclusion is not that ar-
rived at by most attorney general opinions. These opinions 
commenced with that of Attorney General William Wirt in 
1823.88 In this opinion Mr. Wirt changed the terms of the clause. 
When the Senate adjourned without confirming his nomi-
nee to fill a vacancy at the Port of New York, President Monroe 
asked Attorney General William Wirt whether the position 
could be filled a recess appointment. Mr. Wirt's opinion was yes 
it could. In Mr. Wirt's view, the clause's purpose was to allow the 
President to fill a vacancy no matter when it was created. The 
clause "does not look to the moment of the origin of the va-
cancy," he said, "but to the state of things at the point of time at 
which the President is called on to act."89 This true purpose, 
though, could only be arrived at by modifying the terms of the 
clause, which Mr. Wirt did as follows: "Now if we interpret the 
word happen as being merely equivalent to 'happen to exist'," he 
said, "the whole purpose of the constitution is completely ac-
complished. "90 
The text of the clause was thus expanded to read, "vacan-
cies that may happen {to exist} during the recess of the Senate." 
If not the "literal" text of the Clause, Mr. Wirt explained, this 
was its "substantial meaning."91 Subsequent Attorneys General 
87. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 361 (1845); accord Schenck v. Peay, 21 F. Cas. 672, 674 (E.D. 
Ark. 1869) (No. 12,451). 
88. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631 (1823). 
89. !d. at 633. As Mr. Wirt saw it, a vacancy left unfilled, albeit outside the literal 
terms of the clause, "may paralyze some essential branch of our internal police." !d. at 
632. 
90. !d. at 633. 
91. !d. 
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repeated, endorsed, and expanded this reconstruction of the 
clause.92 In 1866, the following question was put to Attorney 
General Henry Stanbery: If a recess appointment is made to a 
post and if there is no permanent appointment (for whatever 
reason) to that post during the next session of the Senate, rna~ 
the President again fill the post by another recess appointment? 
Answering yes, Mr. Stanbery provided an open-ended definition 
of the occasions on which executive power might be exercised. 
Such power, he said, "should always be capable of exercise." On 
this basis, Mr. Stanbery reasoned that a President might daisy 
chain recess appointments as follows: 
As these appointments are to continue until the end of the 
next session of the Senate, the President might omit to make 
any nomination to the Senate, and then, in the ensuing recess, 
reappoint the same or other officers, and thu!> throughout his 
term of office defeat entirely any participation on the part of 
the Senate.94 
B. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION 
At about this point in time, the Congress acted. It acted 
against daisy-chaining recess appointments and, more impor-
tantly, against the idea that the President might, without Senate 
confirmation, fill a post not vacated during the recess in which it 
was made. In 1863, the Senate directed its Judiciary Committee 
to "inquire ... whether the practice ... of appointing officers to 
fill vacancies which have not occurred during the recess of Con-
gress ... is in accord with the Constitution; and if not, what rem-
edy shall be applied. "95 The Judiciary Committee, as it said, en-
deavored to understand the clause according to its "true intent 
and meaning." From this perspective, the recess appointment 
clause was best read as limited to its "plain, popular" meaning, 
which was that the President might fill only those vacancies in 
fact created during the recess in which the appointment was 
made.% The remedy the Committee proposed was that if a 
President wished to fill a post vacated prior to the recess, he 
should do so by assigning the post to an official already con-
firmed by the Senate. 
92. See, e.g., 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 525 (1832) (by Roger Taney as Attorney General). 
93. 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1866). 
94. !d. at 40. 
95. Sen. Report No. 80, Sen. Judiciary Committee, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. at 1 (1863). 
96. !d. at 5. 
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Congress, though, found a stronger remedy in its power of 
the purse. In 1863 Congress provided that "No money shall be 
paid from the Treasury, as salary, to any person appointed dur-
ing the recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy, in any existing of-
fice, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session .... " 
Clearly, this act was more than a pay provision. As was then ex-
plained by Senator Fessenden, "It may not be in our power to 
prevent the appointment, but it is in our power to prevent the 
payment; and when payment is prevented, I think that will 
probably put an end to the habit of making such appoint-
ments."§7 
In 1867, the no-pay provision of the 1863 enactment was 
wrapped into the Tenure of Office Act, which Act in amended 
form remains in effect today.98 This Act limited appointments to 
vacancies caused by "reason of death or resignation during are-
cess." Because the phrase "during a recess" was so pointedly and 
specifically deployed in the Act, it precluded recess appoint-
ments for vacancies created prior to the recess in which an ap-
pointment was made. Also, the Act prevented a President from 
avoiding Senate confirmation by making sequential appoint-
ments running from one recess to the next. These provisions 
were then enforced by providing, "no money shall be paid from 
the treasury" to persons appointed contrary to the Act's provi-
sions.99 
At the start of modern times, the Senate again opposed the 
recess-appointment bypass of Senate confirmation, the occasion 
being President Franklin Roosevelt's previously mentioned 
threat of a recess appointment to the Supreme Court. In 1937 
and while the Senate was in session, Justice Van Devanter re-
signed from the Supreme Court. Whereupon Roosevelt ran up 
this flag: He announced that his choice to fill that vacancy need 
97. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 565 (1863). 
98. Ch. 26, 12 Stat. 646 (1863). 
99. 14 Stat. 430 (1867). The modern amendments to this Act are discussed supra at 
note 77. When the Tenure of Office Act was enacted, animosity between Congress and 
the President, Andrew Johnson, was in those post-Civil War days running high. The 
House had sent a bill of impeachment to the Senate saying that the President had acted 
unlawfully in firing the Secretary of War. The Tenure of Office Act provisions respecting 
recess appointments might, therefore, be dismissed as legislation colored by the heat of 
the moment. However, the recess-appointment issue had started earlier, dating from at 
least the Lincoln presidency. The Judiciary Committee Report, S. Rep. 80, which was 
much the basis of the congressional action in 1867, had been issued in 1863. Also, in 1863 
and as stated above, Congress had acted to deny salary to recess appointees appointed to 
fill vacancies that existed while the Senate when the Senate was in session Ch 26 12 
Stat. 646 (1863). . . ' 
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not be submitted to the Senate. Rather, he might await the Sen-
ate's recess and then on his own motion place a new member of 
the Court. With the political and constitutional waters still roiled 
by Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the Senate was, shall we say, 
perturbed. And it doubted the President's power. As stated by 
Senator Burke, "If there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court ... 
and it did not happen during a recess of the Senate, where would 
the President get any authority to make an appointment to fill 
the vacancy? I do not understand where the authority comes 
from at all."100 
Senator Vandenberg then offered the resolution, the "sense 
of the Senate" was "that an appointment to the Supreme Court 
should be made only at such a time as the Senate may act upon 
confirmation prior to the entry of the nominee upon his ser-
vice. "101 The ensuing debate was much the same as the debate 
that in 1863-67 had preceded the Tenure in Office Act. "For 150 
years," Senator Vandenberg said, "there has been an argument 
as to what the word 'happen' means .... Does 'happen' mean 
'occur', or does it mean 'exist'?" Once again, the Attorneys 
General Opinions were offered in support of the liberal reading. 
The opinion aired in the Senate, though, was that "When these 
precedents are studied, however, so much politics will be found 
... that one hesitates to accept the precedents in place of the 
plain, simple, unmistakable language of the Constitution."102 
During this debate, a few Senators recalled the Tenure in 
Office Act as it provided that "no money shall be paid from the 
Treasury" to an unconfirmed appointee to a vacancy that had 
existed while the Senate was in session. They dryly noted that 
Roosevelt's proposed appointee should not expect to be paid.103 
In the end, FDR did not act on his threat of a recess appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court and the resolution was forgotten. 
About a year after this debate in which the Tenure in Office 
Act and its no-pay provision had been remembered, the Attor-
ney General recommended that the "prohibition" of the Act be 
lifted in certain situations.104 These situations were where a va-
cancy arose within thirty days of the end of a session and where 
100. 81 CONG. REC. 7999 (1937). 
101. 81 CONG. REC. 7963 (1937). 
102. 81 CONG. REC. 807 (1937). 
103. 81 CoNG. REC. 8103 (1937). A small mystery: By what authority were the Ei-
senhower appointees paid for their services prior to confirmation? 
104. Compensation for Recess Appointees in Certain Cases, S. Rep. No. 1079, 76th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). 
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an office is left unfilled because of the action or inaction of the 
Senate while it was in session. In 1940 amidst the start of World 
War II, the Act was quietly amended to include these recom-
mendations. As modified, though, the nucleus of the Act (today 
codified under the title of "Recess Appointments") remains the 
same: "Payment for services may not be made to persons ap-
pointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an exist-
ing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in ses-
sion."105 
C. THE COURTS 
The "celebrated" opmwn on recess appointments was 
handed down in 1868, by Judge John Cadwalader in The Case of 
the District Attorney of the United States. 106 Notable then but 
overlooked today, this opinion nonetheless stands as the most 
thoughtful examination of the scope of the recess appointment 
clause. In this case, the Senate had adjourned without confirm-
ing the President's nominee as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. The President then appointed him 
anyway, as a recess appointee. The question before the court was 
whether that appointment was within the President's power; 
Cadwalader's decision was no, because the vacancy filled had 
been created prior to, and not during, the recess of the Senate. 
Judge Cadwalader found that by their ordinary meaning, 
the terms of the clause limited presidential appointments to 
those that occurred during a recess of the Senate. But as he 
noted, this plain meaning had been disputed, on the grounds that 
public need would at times call for an office to be filled, regard-
less of when it became vacant. He further noted that the clause 
had therefore been interpreted as requiring that a vacancy need 
only "exist" during the recess in which an appointment was 
made. Cadwalader disagreed with this interpretation. He gave 
105. With the added amendments, the Act is as follows: 
Payment for services may not be made from the Treasury of the United States 
to an individual appointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an 
existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session .... This 
subsection does not apply 
(1) if the vacancy arose within 30 days before the end of the session of the 
Senate; 
(2) if, at the end of the session, a nomination for the office ... was pending 
before the Senate ... , or 
(3) if a nomination for the office was rejected by the Senate within 30 days 
before the end of the session .... 
Ch, 580,54 Stat. 751 (1940) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 5503). 
106. 7 F. Cas. 731 (1868) (No. 3924). 
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due regard to such "exigencies" as might attend an unfilled of-
fice but found that these "occasional evils" did not justify a de-
parture from the plain meaning of the text. "If it had been in-
tended to give such amplitude of power to the president," 
Cadwalader wrote, "his authority to fill vacancies in office would 
not have been limited to those happening during a recess." Such 
"amplitude[s] of power," he stated, "had been extensively, de-
bated, and then rejected, at the constitutional convention. "107 
But this conclusion based on text and principle did not end 
his opinion, because, as Cadwalader noted, "It is said that the 
question is not open." It was said not to be open because history 
had reconstructed the clause to permit appointments for vacan-
cies created prior to a recess. Cadwalader disputed this histori-
ography. If the construction had in fact been settled, he asked, 
why had its propriety been submitted to Attorneys General, time 
and again? As Cadwalader put it, "if the same question has been 
repeatedly stated anew, and renewals of the former opinions of 
attorney generals upon it have been obtained from their succes-
sors, this may indicate that no settled administrative usage had 
been understood to be established under the former opinions."108 
Otherwise, seventy-five years ahead of Frankfurter's state-
ment of the "gloss of history" theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion Judge Cadwalader understood what that theory had to en-
tail. The history must include ingredients of acquiescence by 
another branch of government; without which a long-standing 
executive practice stands to be no more than an extended usur-
pation of power. As noted by Cadwalader, Congress and the 
Senate, by the Tenure of Office Act and other measures, had 
over the years opposed rather than ratified the executive prac-
tice.109 Nor had the courts acquiesced. Before Cadwalader ap-
plied his hand, there had been no court decisions on point. Cad-
walader explained: 
There has not been opportunity for judicial contestation: the 
existence of the power in question has not been legislatively 
recognized, has been denied by the senate, has been practi-
cally asserted by presidents only, and has not been exercised 
107. /d. at 734-35. 
I 08. /d.. at 736-38. 
!09. Over the years, Congress had provided for recess appointments when it in a 
particular session it newly created positions that it could not fill during that session. /d. at 
740-44. 
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without constantly recurring suggestions of them of doubts of 
its existence under the constitution.110 
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Judge Cadwalader's opinion was then commended as 
"learned and exhaustive" and it was followedY' The one deci-
sion that did not then follow it, that of the northern district of 
Georgia in In re Farrow, noted Cadwalader's "learned and able" 
opinion.112 Nonetheless, that court found that a recess appoint-
ment to a vacancy not created during a recess of the Senate was 
constitutional. Its constitutionality, the court said, was owed to 
"the practice of the executive department for nearly one hun-
dred years, the acquiescence of the senate therein, and the rec-
ognition of this power by both houses of congress. "113 But that 
acquiescence, as Cadwalader had shown was not the case, so that 
while the court in In re Farrow may have praised the Cad-
walader opinion it surely did not study it. 
Nearly a century later when a court finally revisited the is-
sue, that court, the Second Circuit in United States v. Allocco, re-
lied on In re Farrow and overlooked the case law to the con-
trary.114 The Allocco case involved an appointment to the bench 
to fill a vacancy created prior to the recess in which the ap-
pointment had been made. The argument against the appoint-
ment was that "in the plain language of the Constitution [recess 
appointments] may be used to only to fill vacancies, which "hap-
pen during the Recess of the Senate. "115 The court dismissed that 
argument, saying the "'the logic of words must yield to the logic 
of realities."'116 The realty the court noted was that selecting 
judges entails a long process. For vacancies occurring during a 
Senate session, that process cannot be "telescoped into whatever 
time remains in [the] session."117 When the process of selection 
110. !d. at 744. Cadwalader also relied on scholarly commentary, that of JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,§ 1559 at 355-
56 (2d ed., 1851), and THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373-74 (2d ed. 1830). 
Both treatises supported the literal reading, that the clause gave the President the power 
to make recess appointment for only those vacancies created during the recess in which 
the appointment is made. 
Ill. Schenck v. Peay, 21 F. Cas. 672 (1869) (No.l2,651) (relying on Story, supra note 
110 at Sec. 1559, 355-56, for the proposition that the President "cannot appoint to such 
offices during the Recess of the senate because the vacancy does not happen during the 
recess of the senate"); In re Yancey, 28 F. 445 (W.D. Tenn. 1886). 
112. 3 F. Cas. 112, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1880). 
113. ld. 
114. 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962). 
115. ld. at 710. 
116. ld. 
117. ld. at 712. 
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lasted into a recess, the court reasoned, the President should be 
able to make the appointment at that time or else "leave the of-
fice unfilled for the months until the Senate reconvenes." The 
reality the court did not consider is that recesses are no longer 
for months, as the court said, but for four or five weeks and in 
those few weeks intra- and intercircuit transfers can meet emer-
gency staffing needs on the bench. 
Otherwise, the court found that the "logic of words," that of 
the "during the recess" terms of the clause, had been enlarged by 
history. This history, as the court saw it, consisted of (a) the At-
torneys General opinions liberally construing these terms and 
(b) a ratification of these opinions by the courts and Congress. In 
terms of ratification by the courts, the opinion in Allocco noted 
that the Attorneys General opinions had been "accepted as con-
clusive authority ... in the single reported decision by a federal 
court on the question before us." This decision, the court said, 
was In re Farrow. 118 Overlooked were Judge Cadwalader's opin-
ion and the cases that followed it. Respecting Congress, the 
court felt that the opposition of that body had been softened by 
the 1940 amendment to the Tenure of Office Act. That amend-
ment showed that Congress had now determined that "The de-
terrent to abuse of power by Presidents conceived during the 
Civil War was ... unnecessary and incongruous in an era when 
the President, without the advice and consent of Congress, may 
well have the power to control the destiny of mankind. "119 
The power to control the destiny of mankind is important. It 
does not follow though that Congress by its 1940 amendment to 
the Act altogether abandoned its opposition to recess appoint-
ments that do not conform to the terms of the clause. In that 
Act, the premise that "Payment for services may not be made 
from the Treasury of the United States to an individual ap-
pointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an exist-
ing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session" 
remains in place. 
* * * * * 
At the end of this long, twisting history-of attorney general 
opinions and congressional reactions and court cases-we return 
to the question with which we started: Have the "happen during 
118. ld. at 715. 
119. ld. 
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the Recess of the Senate" terms of the recess appointments 
clause been enlarged by history? Over time, one development 
has been that Senate recesses are now for a few weeks rather 
than the several months the clause anticipated. Thus, the prob-
lem addressed by the clause, leaving an important office unfilled 
over the months of a recess, is no longer pressing, which fact ar-
gues against enlarging the clause past its terms. Be that as it may, 
the question still remains whether wisely or not, the clause has 
over time been enlarged by a practice of appointments to fill va-
cancies that did not "happen during the Recess of the Senate." 
The weight of this history is debatable, though, because it 
doesn't clearly include the essential ingredient of ratification by 
the other branches of government. 
For 135 years Congress has stated its opposition to this prac-
tice by means of the Tenure in Office Act. Perhaps, however, the 
1940 amendment of the Act may be taken as a congressional 
ratification of a limited enlargement of the clause. The amend-
ment provides that if "at the end of the session, a nomination for 
the office ... was pending before the Senate" the President can 
go ahead and fill that office by a recess appointment. This 
enlargement, if valid, covers the recess appointments made by 
Presidents Clinton and Bush, which were for appointees nomi-
nated by the President and not voted on by the Senate. 
Whatever the "nomination pending before the Senate" pro-
vision may amount to otherwise, it should be noted that the 
Tenure in Office Act and this exception to it pertains to all ap-
pointments. The federal courts are a special case, subject-as the 
Supreme Court reminds us in Nguyen v. United States120-to an 
overarching congressional plan of reserving seats on them to 
judges holding lifetime tenure under Article III. For the federal 
courts, Congress, in Title 28 of the United States Code, requires 
that district court and court of appeals judges "shall hold office 
during good behavior."121 Recess appointees do not "hold office 
during good behavior." This noncompliance of recess appoint-
ments to Title 28 is offered simply to show that in the total 
scheme of congressional action, acquiescence by that body to 
any enlargement of the recess appointments clause that would 
place non-Article III judges in federal courts is a fact not easily 
established. 
120. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003). 
121. 28 U.S.C. § 44(b) (2000) provides, "Circuit judges shall hold office during good 
behavior." 28 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2000) provides, "The district judges shall hold office dur· 
ing good behavior." 
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Moreover, congressional concessions, or claims of such con-
cession, respecting the appointments power should not in any 
event be lightly accepted. As explained by the Supreme Court: 
The Appointments Clause ... preserves ... the Consti-
tution's structural integrity by preventing the diffusion 
of the appointment power. ... Neither Congress nor the 
Executive can agree to waive this structural protec-
tion .... The structural interests protected by the Ap-
pointments Clause are not those of aniz one branch of 
Government but of the entire Republic. 22 
"Non-waiver" being the case, the courts should independently 
review any claim of congressional concession to see if fits the 
terms and purposes of the recess appointments clause. 
Also, more is at stake here than waiver of senatorial pre-
rogative. For recess appointments to the bench, enlargements of 
the appointments power operate in the face of individual right, 
that of a litigant to be heard by a judge free of political domina-
tion. In this personal rights context, Congress may be conceding 
that which does not belong to it. Not precisely on this point but 
nonetheless persuasive, Judge Norris in the Woodley case noted, 
"Our system affords each individual litigant the opportunity to 
vindicate his or her personal rights through the judicial process. 
The political branches cannot extinguish such rights by establish-
ing 'adverse possession' through longstanding historical prac-
tice."123 Finally, and no doubt this goes without saying, even if 
Presidents Clinton and Bush had the power the make appoint-
ments to vacancies created prior to the recess of the Senate, 
there remains the primary issue, whether that power is checked 
by the right to a judge free of political domination. 
CONCLUSION 
If the power to make recess appointments is defined accord-
ing to the terms of the clause, which provide for appointments to 
fill only those vacancies that "happen during a recess of the Sen-
ate," then the modern practice of recess appointments to the 
bench will be ended. Today, these appointments are for vacan-
cies created not during but prior to the recess in which they are 
122. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878·80 (1991). 
!23. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 1985); cf Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) ("By increasi~g the pow~r. of t~e President 
beyond what the Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the pohtical liberty of our 
citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure."). 
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made. If the power is not so limited, then for recess appoint-
ments to the bench a conflict between power and right, arises, 
the right being that of a litigant to be heard by a judge freed of 
political domination. Where an appointment to the bench is not 
justified in terms of the urgent public purpose upon which the 
recess appointment clause rests (and today, for appointments to 
the bench, no such urgency will likely exist), then in the conflict 
of power and right the right should prevail. 
POSTSCRIPT 
By letter of March 5, 2004, to the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Senator Edward Kennedy has particularly objected to 
the recess appointment of William Pryor to that court. The ob-
jection is that the appointment was not made during the recess 
between the sessions of the Senate but was instead made during 
an intrasession recess over the Presidents' Day holiday. In terms 
of the substantial principles at play in these appointments, this 
intrasession as opposed to an intersession objection seems a 
small point. Intersession and intrasession appointments alike 
breach a litigant's right to be heard be a judge free of political 
domination. Likewise, any one of the Clinton/Bush appoint-
ments are outside the ordinary sense and terms of the clause in 
that they were for vacancies that did not "happen during the Re-
cess of the Senate." 
But while it may be a relatively small point, the Kennedy 
letter does have a point. The recess appointments clause identi-
fies the recess between two full sessions of the Senate, not a re-
cess within a session. The manifest purpose for the clause is to 
allow for appointments during the predictably long recess be-
tween full sessions, when Senators would have dispersed out of 
the capital for months or so, beyond the reach of quick recall. 
This purpose is carried out by the terms of the clause. The clause 
refers to the singular, to "the Recess" and not to "recesses." 
Also, inasmuch as the clause refers to "all vacancies" that "hap-
pen during the Recess," surely the clause would similarly say "all 
recesses" if it included the indefinite number of breaks that may 
occur during a session. Finally, the clause provides that recess 
appointments "shall expire at the end of their next session." 
"Their next session" clearly refers to the next full session of the 
Senate; it would make no sense for an appointee's term to end 
within weeks at the Senate's first intrasession recess. By parallel 
construction, the "the Recess of the Senate" must also refer to a 
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full session of the Senate and mean a recess between two full 
sessions as opposed to an intrasession recess.124 
This reading of the clause is, I know, inconsistent with vari-
ous Attorneys General opinions.125 But then these opinions are 
inconsistent with the terms of the clause, which fact was recog-
nized in the first Attorney General Opinion on point, that of 
Philander Chase Knox in 1901. President Theodore Roosevelt 
had asked Knox whether he might properly make an appoint-
ment during a seventeen-day recess for Christmas. The opinion 
given was that this was not a "recess" within the meaning of the 
recess appointments clause, inasmuch as that clause provided 
only for "the period after the final adjournment of Congress for 
the session, and before the next session begins. "126 The subse-
quent opinions that approved intra-session appointments relied 
not on the ordinary meaning of the clause but rather versions of 
"the practical sense" of it. Attorney General Harry Daugherty in 
the first of these opinions stated, "the real question, as I view it, 
is whether in a practical sense the Senate is in session so that its 
advice and consent can be obtained. "127 In his opinion to the con-
trary, Attorney General Knox had not been blind to this "practi-
cal sense." However, an "argument from inconvenience," he 
said, "like the argument against a power because of its possible 
abuse, can not be admitted to obscure the true principles and 
distinctions ruling the point. "128 
124. See Memorandum from the Senate (July 1, 1993) (at S8545 & S8546) (on intra-
session appointments). 
125. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 20 (1921) (Attorney General Daug~erty). A more recent 
opinion to the same effect is that of the Office of Legal Counsel m 16 U.S. Op. OLC 15 
(1993). . . . . 
126. 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 599, 601 (1901). The question of mtrasesswn appomtments 
did not arise until the twentieth century and this opinion was the first to address the 
question. 
127. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. at 21-22 (emphasis in the original). 
128. 23 Op. Att'y Gen. at 603. 
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APPENDIX 
SUPREME COURT RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
Actions 
Recess Heard 
Justice App't Confirmation Prior to Confirm a-
tion 
Thomas Johnson 08/0511791 11/07/1791 none 
John Rutledge 07/01/1795 Nom. rejected, 2 
12/15/1795 
Bushrod Washington 09/29/1798 12/20/1798 none 
Alfred Moore 10/2011799 12/10/1799 none 
Henry Livingston 11/10/1806 12/17/1806 none 
Smith Thompson 09/0111823 12/09/1823 none 
John McKinlc::y_ 11108/1837 09/2511837 none 
Levi Woodbury 09/20/1845 01103/1846 none 
Benjamin Curtis 09/22/1851 12/20/1851 2 
David Davis 10/17/1862 12/08/1862 none 
John Marshall Harlan 03/29/1877 11/29/1877 none 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 08/11/1902 12/02/1902 none 
Earl Warren 10/02/1953 03/01/1954 several 
William Brennan 10/15/1956 03/19/1957 several 
Potter Stewart 10/14/1958 05/05/1959 several 
